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APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Respondent against
Appellants to enforce the provisions of an inter vivos trust
executed by Respondent's grandmother and Appellants' mother.
Respondent seeks a $7,000.00 distribution in addition to one-fourth
of the residuary estate. Appellants, as co-trustees and beneficiaries of the residuary estate, seek to reform the trust
instrument by excluding Respondent from sharing equally in the
residuary estate because of a scrivener's error by the attorney

-2preparing the trust instrument.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A non-jury trial was had in this matter and the trial
Judge granted judgment in favor of Respondent holding that an
inter vivos trust cannot be reformed after the death of the
trustor upon the claim of a scrivener's error.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the Judgment in the trial
Court and for an order directing that said trust instrument be
reformed allowing Respondent his $7,000.00 distribution but
excluding Respondent from sharing equally with Appellants in the
residuary estate of the trust.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1968, the trustor, Delia Zillah C. Rentmeister,
retained attorney, William J. Critchlow, III, to perform estate
planning services (R. 81). An inter vivos trust was prepared,
executed by trustor and trustees, and introduced into evidence as
Exhibit "A" (R. 45). The trust became immediately operative and
was funded by the transfer of real and personal property (R. 54
& 86) .
During her first visit to Mr. Critchlow, trustor was
undecided as to what part of her estate she should leave to her
grandson who is the Respondent herein (R. 83). Trustor later

-3telephoned Mr. Critchlow advising him she wished to lea
Respondent the sum of $5,000.00 and she confirmed tv
call with a handwritten note entered into evidence
(R. 83, 84, Sc 55b). Exhibit ,fC,f provides in part
"I would like to leave my grandson I
Rentmeister $5,000.00 and hope that .
fair. Delia Rentmeister phone 825-2472."
Pursuant to trustor's directions, the trust instrument
provided in Article III, paragraph E, that Respondent was to
receive $5,000.00 from the trust estate (R. 49 & 50).
Through inadvertence and mistake on the part of the
attorney, Article III, paragraph F, was dictated without excluding
Respondent from sharing in the residuary estate with the three
natural children of trustor, Appellants herein, (R. 50 & 88). The
error was not discovered when the trust was executed nor later
when it was amended (R. 88 & 89).
In 1971, trustor telephoned Mr. Critchlow and directed
him to increase Respondent's share from $5,000.00 to $7,000.00
(R. 88). Pursuant to this direction, an amendment to the trust
was prepared increasing Respondent's share to $7,000.00 (R. 88).
Said amendment was introduced into evidence as Exhibit "B" (R. 55).
Thereafter, trustor passed away on November 2, 1973
(R. 88). Following trustor's death, Mr. Critchlow received a
telephone call from an attorney representing Respondent demanding
payment of $7,000.00 together with an undivided one-fourth interest
in the residuary estate of the trust (R. 89). It was at this time
that the scrivener's error was discovered and discussed (R. 89).

-4Should the trust not be reformed, Respondent, as a
grandson of trustor, would receive $7,000.00 more than the natural
children of trustor (R. 90). A one-fourth share of the residuary
estate amounts to approximately $20,000.00 (R. 90).
After said demand from Respondent's attorney, Appellants,
as co-trustees and beneficiaries of the trust estate, refused to
distribute to Respondent an undivided one-fourth interest in the
residuary estate and Respondent filed suit (R. 1 & 12). In
response thereto, Appellants filed an Answer and Counterclaim
praying for reformation of Article III, paragraph F, of the trust
instrument (R. 2).
On October 3, 1975, the matter was tried before the
Honorable Calvin Gould as a non-jury trial (R. 38). Exhibits "A"
and "B", representing the trust instrument and amendment, were
entered into evidence by stipulation and Respondent rested his
case (R. 7 8).

Thereafter, Appellants called Attorney William J.

Critchlow, III, who testified concerning trustor's directions and
the scrivener's error.
Thereafter, judgment was entered in favor of Respondent
and against Appellants with the trial Court holding that an inter
vivos trust cannot be reformed after the death of the trustor
upon the claim of a scrivener's error.

The Court further held

that in the absence of fraud or undue influence any variation
between the instructions of the trustor and the completed
document were immaterial (R. 59 & 6 0).

-5ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AN INTER VIVOS TRUST CAN AND SHOULD BE REFORMED
TO CONFORM TO THE TRUSTOR'S INSTRUCTIONS WHEN A
MISTAKE IS MADE BY THE SCRIVENER IN THE PREPARATION OF THE TRUST INSTRUMENT.
Justice and common sense require correction of a
scrivener's mistake in the preparation of a written document when
such mistake thwarts the purposes and intent of the party executing
the document. Reformation of the mistake based upon clear and
convincing evidence is the appropriate remedy.
In Paulsen v. Coombs, 253 P.2d 621, the Utah Supreme
Court rendered judgment reforming a written contract which contained
a provision inserted by inadvertence or mistake. The Court indicated
as follows:
"I am entirely in accord with the principle
of preserving the sanctity of written contracts,
but this applies only when the contract represents the intent of the parties. Where
errors occur, clerical, typographical or otherwise , of course, a contract can be reformed to
show the true intent of the parties. In order
to prove such mistake and avoid the effects of
the written contract, the evidence must be clear
and convincing; that is, it must be such that
there is no serious nor substantial doubt what
the true intent is."
In Webb v. Webb, 209 P.2d 201, where decedent's legal
representative and another were claiming right to realty under
decedent, and decedent's intention was important in determining what
claimants' rights were, and where conversations between the attorney
and the decedent were admitted into evidence, the Utah Supreme Court

-6observed as follows:
111

Thus where, after the death of the client,
litigation arises between parties all of whom
claim under the client and the question to
be determined is not the existence of a right
of action against the estate, but the intention of the decedent as to creation of various
rights which remain ambiguous, the attorney
may testify.***Thus an attorney has been permitted to testify in an inquiry to ascertain,
as between devisees under the client's will
and a grantee claiming under a deed from the
client made after the will, as to what was
intended by the deed.111
In Sine v. Harper, 222 P.2d 571, the Supreme Court of
Utah was asked to reform a deed based on conversations between one of
the parties and the real estate agent.

In holding that this evidence

was properly admitted, the Court quoted language from another opinion
as follows:
"'The conversations between the attorney and
the decedent show the attorney's authority and
the purposes and limitations of such authority.
The conversations between the attorney and
respondents showed negotiations for and the
consummation of a deal with respondents in
accordance with the attorney's authority.
There was no assertion by an extra-judicial
witness of a material fact for the purpose
of proving the existence of such fact, but
the fact that such conversations occurred
were circumstances which showed the purpose
and intention of decedent to convey to the
respondents unconditionally. The attorney
was the one who acted for the decedent in the
transactions involved herein and his evidence
was competent to relate his version thereof
and a relation of the conversations he had
with the principals in the transaction was
not hearsay, even though it necessarily included statements made by the other parties to
the conversation which were not made in the
presence of appellant.

-711

'The rule is thoroughly well settled,1 remarks
the California court, 'that, when the intention,
feelings, or other mental state of a certain
person at a particular time, including his
bodily feelings, is material to the issues under
trial, evidence of such person's declarations at
the time indicative of his then mental state,
even though hearsay, is competent as within an
exception to the hearsay rule.'"
In Hurst v. Kravis, 333 P.2d 314, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma was asked to reform six trust agreements. The settlors
alleged that there had been a clerical error in the preparation of
the trust instruments.

In holding that the trust instruments

should be reformed on the ground of clerical error in their preparation, the Oklahoma Court observed as follows:
"This court has held that a trust may be
reformed because of mistake and clerical
error."
The case of Hurst v. Taubman, 275 P.2d 877, involved
the construction of an express trust and was an action by settlors
against the trustee. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held as follows:
111

In construing the terms of a trust agreement the intention of the settlor of the
trust should control when such intention is
not in conflict with established principles
of law.'"
In Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180, the Supreme Court of
Utah held that the oversight on the part of a scrivener in preparing
a real estate purchase option agreement was a proper basis for
reformation of the document.
In Ford v. Ford, 492 S.W.2d 376, trustees brought suit
against the beneficiary seeking reformation or modification of an

-8irrevocable trust.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas held that

where the attorney who wrote the trust instrument intended to write
the trust in such a fashion as to make it irrevocable for a period
of ten years but made a mistake in drafting the trust, reformation
of the trust instrument to reflect that the trust was irrevocable
was proper.
The case of First National Bank & Trust Company of
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma v. Foster, 346 F.2d 49, involved an action
to require co-trustees to accept an amendment or supplement to a
trust agreement that they were administering.

The United States

Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, held that the intention of the
settlor should control if not in conflict with established principles
of law.
In the case of Title Insurance and Trust Company v.
Guasti, 256 P.2d 629, the District Court of Appeal of California
held that where testamentary trusts contained no provision as to
whether trusts were to be re-evaluated for the purpose of determining
the trustee's fee, that the admission into evidence of custom of
trust companies in the community was proper by way of parol proof.
The Court further indicated that this evidence was necessary to give
effect to the intention of the parties.
In the case of In re Harmon's Trust, 164 N.Y.S.2d 468,
the Supreme Court of New York County held as follows:
"If, in fact, there was a scrivener's error
in transcribing settlor's intention at the
time of creating the trust, it is correctible
by the court in an action to reform the

-9instrument.•.In all the cases where reformation
was granted by the court, petitioner presented
direct and convincing evidence of the necessary
facts of settlor's original intentions and
instructions and of the mistake in the instrument as drawn,"
In the case of Leitner v. Goldwater, 48 N.Y.S.2d 614,
the Supreme Court of Bronx County held that the evidence established
that the settlors intentionally amended the trust agreement so as to
designate their wives as partial beneficiaries, and that the
subsequent modification purporting to reinstate the estates as
beneficiaries arose out of error in transcribing the true agreement
of the parties and that this error was a proper basis for reformation of the trust agreement. The Court further observed that the
failure of the settlors to read the modification which they signed,
because they were busy men who imposed great confidence in their
lawyer, would not of itself vitiate the right to reformation.
In the case of Vogel v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Company,
272 N.Y.S. 643, the Supreme Court of New York County held that a
trust deed could be reformed based upon an error and mistake of
the attorney who prepared the document in failing to include a
revocation clause.
In Sheedy v. Stein, 101 N.Y.S.2d 773, the Supreme Court
of Queens County held that it was proper to reform a deed because
of a scrivener's error by the attorney who drew the deed.

The

Court observed as follows:
"Where a mistake is made by the scrivener in
reducing an agreement to writing, such mistake
may be corrected 'no matter how it occurred.'"

-10In Delap v. Leonard, 178 N.Y.S. 102, the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, of New York, held that it was proper to reform
a deed containing an error made by the lawyer scrivener and
observed as follows:
"The plaintiff should not be penalized
because of this mistake. When there is no
mistake about plaintiff's intention, but only
in the writing, the mistake of the scrivener,
no matter how it occurred, ought to be
corrected.
"And this is so, notwithstanding a long period
of time has elapsed between the time of the
execution of the deed and the discovery of the
mistake."
In the case of Mills v. Schulba, 213 P.2d 408, the
District Court of Appeal of California held that it was proper
to reform a deed because of a mistake of the attorney employed by
the parties to draw up the deed.

The Court observed:

"Our courts have repeatedly held that the
mistake of a draftsman is a good ground for
the reformation of an instrument which does
not truly express the intention of the parties."
In Woolner v. Layne, 159 N.W.2d 237, the Court of Appeals
of Michigan held that the inclusion of tax and insurance clauses
in a lease was due to a scrivener's error which would serve as a
basis for reformation of the document.

The Court observed:

"The mistake was made when the real estate
broker's secretary chose a printed form
which contained clauses which had not been
bargained for or discussed. Indeed, this was
a scrivener's error and 'the clearest case for
reformation is one involving a scrivener's
error.'"

-11In Sunnybrook Children's Homef Inc., v. Dahlem, 265
SO.2d 921, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that a scrivener's
error in a deed was a proper basis for its reformation.
In Artmar, Inc., v. United Fire and Casualty Company,
14 8 N.W. 2d 641, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the
negligence of an insurance agent in failing to incorporate
insurance desires of insured into the insurance contract was a
proper basis for reformation of the insurance contract. The Court
observed:
11

'A mistake due to the negligence of an
agent, acting within the the scope of his
employment, is satisfactory ground for
reformation, since the insured ordinarily
relies upon the agent to set out properly
the facts in the application.1"
At the trial of the subject matter, Respondent argued
that the rules pertaining to wills should be applied to the subject
inter vivos trust. The trustor, Mrs. Rentmeister, executed a Last
Will and Testament which was not material to the case and was not
introduced into evidence.

It was the trustor's inter vivos trust

that was at issue and not her will.

We submit that an inter vivos

trust that is effective immediately upon execution and one that is
created during the lifetime of the trustor is not a will and
should not be treated as such.

In 1 Restatement of Trusts 2d §57,

the following is found:
"Disposition Inter Vivos Where Settlor
Reserves Power to Revoke, Modify or Control
"Where an interest in the trust property is
created in a beneficiary other than the
settlor, the disposition is not testamentary

-12and invalid for failure to comply with the
requirements of the Statute of Wills merely
because the settlor reserves a beneficial
life interest or because he reserves in
addition a power to revoke the trust in whole
or in part, and a power to modify the trust,
and a power to control the trustee as to the
administration of the trust,
"Comment:
"a. Where settlor reserves power to revoke
and modify. Where the owner of property transfers it inter vivos to another person in trust,
the disposition is not testamentary merely
because the interest of the beneficiary does not
take effect in enjoyment or possession before
the death of the settlor (see §56, Comment f ) ,
or because in addition he reserves power to revoke
or modify the trust. In such a case the trust
is created in the lifetime of the settlor, and
the mere fact that he can destroy it or alter
it does not make the disposition testamentary,
although if the trust were not to arise until his
death the disposition would be testamentary.
See §56.
"b. Where settlor reserves power of control.
Where the owner of property transfers it inter
vivos to another person in trust, the fact that
he reserves not only a power to revoke and
modify the trust but also power to control the
trustee as to the administration of the trust
does not make the disposition testamentary and
invalid for failure to comply with the requirements of the Statute of Wills.
11

c. Restrictions on testamentary disposition.
The rule stated in this Section is applicable
although the trust is one which could not be
created by will. If the owner of property
transfers it inter vivos to another person in
trust, the intended trust is not invalid
merely because the settlor reserves a beneficial
life estate and a power to revoke or modify the
trust, even though he was prohibited by statute
from creating a similar trust by will.
"Thus, if it is provided by statute that the
wife of a testator shall be entitled to a certain
portion of his estate of which she cannot be

-13deprived by will (see §146A), a married man can
nevertheless transfer his property inter vivos in
trust and his widow will not be entitled on his
death to a share of the property so transferred,
even though he reserves a life estate and power
to revoke or modify the trust. Where, however,
an outright gift would not operate to deprive
the wife of her distributive share, a trust
created under the same circumstances would be
equally ineffective.
"d. Purpose of the settlor. A trust in which
the settlor reserves the beneficial life estate
and a power to revoke and modify the trust is not
invalid for failure to comply with the requirements
of the Statute of Wills merely because the purpose
of the settlor in creating the trust was to avoid
the requirements of the Statute of Wills or to
avoid the necessity of probate administration, or
to avoid restrictions on testamentary dispositions.11
In 1 Restatement of Trusts 2d Appendix §57, the following
is found:
"There is a difference between the situation
where the death of the settlor is a condition
precedent to the creation of a trust, and the
situation where the trust is created during
the lifetime of the settlor, although he
reserves power to revoke it. In the former
case no trust is created unless the requirements for the execution of a will are complied
with. See §56. In the latter case the trust
is not testamentary and may be created without
compliance with the requirements for the
execution of a will."

CONCLUSION
The testimony of the attorney at the trial in this
matter and Exhibit "C" representing the written directions of
trustor establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent was meant to receive a specific cash distribution

-14and was not to share with the three natural children in the
residuary estate of the trust.

It is clear that a scrivener's

mistake occurred when the attorney failed to exclude Respondent
from the provisions of the paragraph distributing the residuary
estate.
There appears to be a unanimity among the cases that
the most obvious basis for reformation is a scrivener's mistake
which thwarts the purposes and intention of the party executing
the document. Trusts, contracts and deeds have been routinely
reformed when the evidence was clear and convincing that a
scrivener's error had taken place.
We respectfully urge the Court to reverse the judgment
of the Trial Court and direct that the subject inter vivos trust
be reformed to exclude Respondent from sharing in the residuary
estate.

Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD H. THORNLEY
2610 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for
Defendants and Appellants
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